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WHY HAPPINESS?: A COMMENTARY ON 
GRIFFITH’S PROGRESSIVE TAXATION  
AND HAPPINESS 
Diane M. Ring* 
Abstract: This Commentary examines three issues raised in Professor 
Thomas D. Grifªth’s Article on the connection between progressive tax-
ation and subjective well-being, focusing on the selection of happiness as 
the measure of the gains of redistribution, the ability to measure happi-
ness or subjective well-being, and the implications of using happiness 
analysis in determining tax policy. After arguing that the progressive 
taxation debate would beneªt from further exploration of why happiness 
is the appropriate measure of success, this Commentary raises concerns 
about relying on self-reporting of subjective well-being and how happiness 
studies should be interpreted and can be improved. Finally, this Com-
mentary notes that studies of income and happiness may inform tax 
policy design by helping to determine the appropriate balance between 
taxes and expenditures, outlining a role for the government in informing 
taxpayers’ perceptions of happiness, and focusing additional research 
necessary for an effective progressive taxation policy. 
Introduction 
 Professor Thomas D. Grifªth’s Article begins with the enticing 
proposition of linking taxation and happiness—words not often con-
nected in the taxation literature. Taxation and happiness become in-
tertwined in the analysis of progressive taxation and the arguments 
favoring redistribution of income. The Article accepts the premise 
that some level of redistribution is desirable and seeks to answer the 
remaining but important question of how much redistribution is op-
timal. A key component of this inquiry concerns the determination of 
the welfare gains from redistribution.1 Measuring gains from redistri-
bution has always been a daunting task because the inquiry is empiri-
cally difªcult and requires the incorporation of other ªelds of study. 
Nonetheless, if our goal is to develop progressive tax policy more 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Frederick G. Levin College of Law. 
1 Such gains would then be weighed against any costs. 
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thoroughly, we must attempt to deªne what constitutes utility or wel-
fare and determine how it should be measured. 
 Reºecting the core elements in Professor Grifªth’s analysis, my 
comments fall into the following three categories: (1) establishing the 
relationship between the progressive taxation analysis and the selec-
tion of happiness as the measure of gains from redistribution, (2) ex-
amining the existing happiness research and literature (outside taxa-
tion), and (3) discussing the implications of using the happiness 
analysis for tax policy. 
I. The Relationship 
 Professor Grifªth does not contend that happiness is the exclu-
sive measure for evaluating taxpayers’ gains from additional income, 
but the reliance on this single measure does raise questions about 
how we should envision utility or welfare. The beginning of the Arti-
cle suggests loosely (but certainly quite plausibly) that measures of 
happiness from redistribution would be valuable in assessing tax poli-
cies.2 Other parts of the Article, however, seem to equate happiness 
afªrmatively with the measurement of utility in the welfare analysis. 
Happiness is a likely component of utility, but its selection requires us 
to consider what the term does and does not capture. How, and in 
what ways, is happiness a good proxy for measuring utility? How does 
it compare to the concept of well-being, which the Article identiªes 
but puts aside at the outset? It may be productive to revisit the choice 
of happiness as the focal measurement and distinguish it from other 
terms and criteria that could contribute to utility. In some cases, it 
may be that terms such as happiness or well-being are conceived 
broadly or are intended to be effectively synonymous. Regardless, 
though, additional clariªcation as to why happiness was selected and 
what other measures might also be considered, as well as how they 
could be coordinated, would move the progressive taxation debate 
toward concrete tax policy choices. 
                                                                                                                      
2 Thomas D. Grifªth, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. Rev., 1363, 1364 
(2004). 
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II. Measuring and Assessing Happiness 
A. Reporting Concerns 
 As part of the process of measuring happiness for use in tax pol-
icy, Professor Grifªth turns to the growing empirical and psychologi-
cal literature on happiness. Before drawing upon this fascinating body 
of work, Professor Grifªth ªrst considers potential reporting prob-
lems in the measurement of happiness.3 In addition to those outlined 
in the Article, three others may be worth exploring. First, recent re-
search indicates that people tend to overestimate the intensity of both 
good and bad future events (“impact bias”).4 When this holds true, it 
becomes relevant whether we are measuring happiness before or after 
events occur. The assessment of happiness may be different at each 
point. Further, we must consider which point would be more relevant. 
The “before” state may affect the party’s behavior vis-à-vis the event, 
but the “after” state may be experienced for a much longer time pe-
riod. Moreover, in cases of regularly repeated events (such as the 
withholding of income taxes from a paycheck every month), how does 
impact bias operate? This is a critical question because progressive tax 
reform would initially take the form of a future event whose impact 
individuals presumably would overstate (either positively or nega-
tively). Once in place, however, the reform would constitute the exist-
ing state of the world. Asking about impact bias in this manner high-
lights the distinction between happiness with regard to an anticipated 
amount of income and happiness with regard to an anticipated tax 
regime. To the extent we are seeking to measure utility (whether 
through measures of happiness with income or some other criteria), 
we face the question of how to incorporate the effect of the tax re-
gime itself (rather than simply the individual’s end of the day in-
come) on self-reported happiness or satisfaction. Impact bias can exist 
in both cases, but it need not be identical. 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. at 1366–71. 
4 See Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting 
of Future Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cogni-
tion 178, 185–94 ( Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Trouble with 
Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in The Wisdom in Feeling: 
Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence 114, 116–37 (Lisa Feldman Bar-
rett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002); see also Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Dura-
bility Bias in Affective Forecasting, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 821, 821–35 (2000). This 
claim is related to, but distinct from, concepts such as adaptation theory identiªed in Pro-
fessor Grifªth’s Article. 
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 Second, in terms of reporting accuracy, there may be a fundamen-
tal difference between asking about happiness (potentially more of a 
transitory concept) and satisfaction (potentially more of a big-picture 
concept). Generally, Professor Grifªth uses the term “happiness,” but 
in some places, he seems to interchange it with “satisfaction,” without 
clarifying whether the terms are identical or, if not, how they are dif-
ferent. For example, “life satisfaction” seems to connote being in a 
good position or place, whereas “happiness” seems to connote more 
ephemeral feelings. Consider how many ªrst year law students are 
“happy.” It might not be surprising if most students were “satisªed” 
with their situation in life while simultaneously declaring themselves 
“miserable.” To the extent these concepts are different, which should 
we seek to promote through the tax system? 
 The third reporting caveat derives from studies indicating that 
individuals perceive and tolerate pain differently depending on their 
perception of their ability to control the pain.5 For example, these 
studies indicate that when individuals have more direct control over 
the delivery of pain medication, they report less pain and anxiety and 
require less pain medication.6 These observations translate to the tax 
arena—if we ªnd that taxpayers seem averse to progressive (or more 
progressive) taxation yet simultaneously purport to support redistri-
bution in society (such as through charitable contributions) the ap-
parent conºict may be due in part to the respondents’ perceptions of 
differences in control. One can cease voluntary charitable contribu-
tions (that promote redistribution) more readily than one can reduce 
one’s tax bill. This conclusion does not mean that taxes should be 
voluntary, but it can help explain potential gaps between reported 
views on redistribution versus progressive taxation. 
                                                                                                                      
5 See David A. Graves et al., Patient-Controlled Analgesia, 99 Annals Internal Med. 360, 
364 (1983) (citing evidence that patients using patient-controlled pain devices experience 
less pain and that anxiety may be minimized as compared to the traditional “as needed” 
pain medication regime involving multiple steps and the assistance of a nurse); E.J. Mun-
dell, Computer-Driven Pain Patch Shows Promise, HealthDay News (Mar. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.healthday.com/view.cfm?id=517944 (noting the “psychological boost” from 
patient-controlled pain devices and quoting Robert Coghill that “‘pain becomes much 
more manageable when there’s a perception that it’s controlled. . . . By giving patients the 
ability to control pain, it makes it much easier to treat.’”); David R. Zimmerman, Taking 
Care: Freedom from Pain, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, § 6, pt. 2 (Good Health Magazine), at 8. 
6 See Graves et al., supra note 5, at 364; Mundell, supra note 5; Zimmerman, supra note 5. 
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B. Implications of the Happiness Studies 
 Professor Grifªth draws upon the following three categories of 
happiness studies to illuminate the redistribution question: cross-
national comparisons, longitudinal studies, and individual assess-
ments. Each category provides interesting insight into the relation-
ship between income and happiness, although each also generates 
questions for how such insights ultimately should be interpreted. 
 The cross-national studies, which consider how countries rank in 
terms of happiness and income, treat each country effectively as an 
individual unit and then compare countries to see what conclusions 
can be drawn regarding income, happiness, and other possible fac-
tors. Although these studies are fascinating and useful, it would be 
valuable to consider how a country-based study differs from studies 
comparing actual individuals. A country is not an individual unit with 
a particular happiness and income level, but rather it is a measure 
drawn from all of the data points of happiness and income within that 
country (by median or mean). Thus, unique but critical features re-
garding the country may be disguised by the creation of the single 
data point for that country. Obvious possibilities include linguistic 
and cultural differences between and among countries that would 
inºuence the reporting within a country along a particular dimension 
and thereby be reºected in the ªnal numbers for that country. Profes-
sor Grifªth identiªes a number of these concerns, but additional fac-
tors may also be inºuential. For example, in the European Union 
study covering the period from 1973 through 1998, residents of Den-
mark were found to be ªve times more likely to report that they were 
very satisªed with their lives than residents of France or Italy.7 Not 
only might this marked disparity reºect underlying cultural differ-
ences, it might also be due to the shape of the income distribution 
curve in the individual countries. That is, even if countries have rela-
tively similar per capita income, the countries’ internal distributions 
of income may be quite different. To the extent that studies of indi-
vidual assessments of happiness suggest that one’s happiness with a 
given level of income can be inºuenced by one’s relative income rank-
ing in that society, the shape of a country’s income distribution curve 
may inºuence the happiness number emerging from that country. 
                                                                                                                      
7 Ronald Inglehart & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happi-
ness, in Culture and Subjective Well-Being 165, 166–67 (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh 
eds., 2000); see Grifªth, supra note 2, at 1371. 
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 Another potential difªculty with relying on cross-national com-
parisons is the potential effect of “directional” or “trajectory” factors 
on the residents’ reported happiness. For example, in the World Val-
ues Survey discussed by Professor Grifªth, Japan appears to be an in-
teresting outlier.8 It has median income comparable to Denmark, 
Belgium, Iceland, and Norway, but reports signiªcantly lower mean 
life satisfaction.9 Again, one possible explanation is a cultural report-
ing difference. Another independent possibility, however, is what 
might be termed a “directional” or “trajectory” explanation. Japan has 
experienced signiªcant economic stagnation or decline for some pe-
riod of time, and this reality may have shaped survey respondents’ 
views of their income situation. Having $X of income today may seem 
less attractive to someone who had $X+$Y of income several years 
ago. Moreover, if one’s view of the future is less optimistic, then a 
given amount of income today may generate less happiness than it 
would under a different economic forecast.10 This explanation could 
also account for the fact that residents of the former Soviet block 
seem more unhappy than their income would predict. If such resi-
dents perceive the stability and trajectory of their economy more 
negatively than residents of countries with comparable or even lower 
incomes, then residents of the former Soviet block may report lower 
happiness. 
 Finally, in an effort to eliminate potential factors inºuencing the 
income-happiness correlation, Professor Grifªth cites studies arguing 
that there is almost no correlation between human rights and subjec-
tive well-being (after controlling for income). Depending on what the 
studies were measuring and comparing speciªcally, however, it is plau-
sible that (1) where human rights violations are combined with low 
income, the respondents focus on subsistence needs (relating to ar-
guments raised by Professor Grifªth about the unique nature of 
money used for subsistence versus luxury goods), or (2) where human 
rights violations are signiªcant, respondents fear reprisal from non-
democratic governments, and thus report differently in the studies. 
 None of these questions regarding cross-national studies negates 
their role or use. Instead, the questions seek to highlight additional 
                                                                                                                      
8 Grifªth, supra note 2, at 1371–73. 
9 Id. at 1372–73 figs.1 & 3. 
10 For example, even if one’s current income is not less than what it was in the past, 
one’s perception (due to unshakeable or looming economic conditions) of the future 
chances of maintaining or improving one’s position in society could inºuence one’s re-
ported happiness in the present. 
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areas of comparison or investigation that could further improve our 
understanding of the factors contributing to happiness and their rela-
tionship to an individual’s income. For example, to the extent that a 
deeper examination of cross-country comparisons supports the hy-
pothesis that the income distribution curve for a country, as well as 
speciªc levels of income, are relevant to happiness, we may draw dif-
ferent conclusions about the amount and the structure of progressiv-
ity that we would seek to pursue in our own income tax system. 
 The longitudinal studies cited by Professor Grifªth of per capita 
income and happiness in the United States over the period from 1972 
through 1998 indicate that as per capita income increased (that is, the 
country experienced some signiªcant economic growth), reported 
happiness did not similarly increase.11 Initially, this result (reºected 
also in the cited studies of France and Japan) seems inconsistent with 
the cross-country comparisons that demonstrate a connection be-
tween per capita income and happiness. As Professor Grifªth argues, 
however, the cross-country comparisons reveal not only a basic con-
nection between per capita income and mean happiness, but also 
demonstrate that among poorer nations, increasing per capita in-
come has a more signiªcant impact on happiness than it does among 
wealthier nations. Thus, Professor Grifªth concludes that the longitu-
dinal studies of countries such as the United States, France, and Japan 
can be understood as further demonstrating that additional income is 
not very signiªcant for happiness in developed countries, but is sub-
stantially more signiªcant for poorer nations. While that conclusion 
seems consistent with the cross-national studies and with some of the 
studies regarding individual assessments of happiness, there exists an-
other possible, yet unexplored, inºuence on the happiness numbers 
for the developed countries. To the extent the longitudinal studies 
cover a substantial period of time, it is possible that “symbol drift”— 
changes in what is being studied—has occurred. Assuming demo-
graphic shifts in the respondents in each country (that is, if a large 
group of “baby boomers” had come of survey age), the nature of sur-
vey responses for the country may have changed accordingly. 
 The ªnal set of happiness studies, which examines individual 
happiness within a nation, offers another window into the effect of 
income on happiness. These studies eliminate many of the variables— 
cultural, linguistic, political, or other macro factors—at the national 
level that can plague cross-national comparisons. At the same time, 
                                                                                                                      
11 Grifªth, supra note 2, at 1375–78. 
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these studies allow us to consider other factors that inºuence percep-
tions of income. For example, cited evidence that the average happi-
ness of a reporting cohort remains fairly stable over lifetimes (even 
though income grows signiªcantly) can be viewed, as Professor Grif-
ªth suggests, as consistent with the longitudinal data that higher in-
come levels contribute little to happiness, at least among wealthier 
nations. The cohort data may point, however, to an alternative con-
clusion—one linked to the aging of the reporting group in cohort 
studies. It may be that one’s happiness with a given level of income 
operates partly as a function of age and expectations for that age 
level. Thus, as income increases over one’s life, happiness does not 
increase commensurately because the additional income in fact 
represents an expected and perhaps needed ªnancial boost.12 Such 
an observation regarding cohort studies does not reject the conten-
tion that additional income does not markedly increase happiness, or 
that income effects on happiness have a rivalrous or comparative as-
pect. Rather, it contends that age and expectations may impact the 
effect of income on happiness. Further, it maintains that studies in-
volving aging or shifting populations (regardless of whether the aging 
or shifting population was in fact an intended feature of the study) 
should account for such effects in drawing conclusions about the na-
ture and strength of the income-happiness relationship.13 Moreover, 
as we consider a range of potential progressive taxation policies, the 
impact of income on happiness at different ages may guide the struc-
ture and design of tax policy. 
 Another feature of the income-happiness relationship, drawn 
from the studies of individuals, concerns the rivalrous nature of in-
come. Studies indicate that individuals show more rivalry with respect 
to income than leisure. Part of the explanation for this observation, 
however, may derive not from some inherent difference in competi-
tiveness over income as compared to leisure, but rather from the fact 
that individuals seek power as an end. Income levels that place indi-
viduals higher up in their national income chart can increase the 
power of those individuals, which has its own independent value. Al-
                                                                                                                      
12 As the cohort ages, ªnancial burdens and expenses may be increasing as many re-
spondents marry, have families, and plan for retirement. In addition, other costs may be 
growing such as health and dental care, risk hedging (involving disability, life, and long-term 
care insurance), and opportunity costs (decreasing likelihood of an individual ªnding new 
work if ªred). 
13 For example, cohort studies would by deªnition contemplate aging populations. In 
contrast, a longitudinal study might unexpectedly include shifting populations. 
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though absolute income has a concrete role (for example, being ade-
quate to relieve subsistence needs), relative income can offer power 
and inºuence in society (for example, increasing political access). 
Procuring more leisure than one’s friends may not translate so readily 
into more power. If we ascertain that income is rivalrous partly be-
cause of its power implications, we have an additional independent 
policy interest in curbing the burgeoning income gap in the country. 
Where accumulations of income and wealth confer power, a democ-
ratic society may seek to limit such power by limiting the income and 
wealth accumulations of the upper bracket taxpayers.14 
 The study referenced by Professor Grifªth of a unique group of 
individuals experiencing increased income—lottery winners—seems 
in line with indications that greater income does not produce corre-
sponding increases in happiness.15 It also appears consistent with the 
distinct psychological concept of impact bias noted above—that indi-
viduals overestimate the intensity of positive or negative feelings from 
an event. The case of lottery winners, however, raises the issue that 
how one obtains money—not just the level of income—inºuences the 
amount of happiness generated. If third parties show a greater will-
ingness to press lottery winners for ªnancial assistance, as opposed to 
pressing other high income individuals, then the additional income 
of lottery winners comes with burdens not typically associated with 
earning money through business or labor. An interesting line of inves-
tigation would examine whether lottery winners demonstrate less 
happiness than other individuals of equal income who acquired their 
money through labor or investment activity.16 
 Finally, studies of individuals based on the misery index and the 
impact of unemployment and inºation should be interpreted to call 
for different policies for different respondent populations. One of the 
studies Professor Grifªth refers to indicates that unemployment re-
                                                                                                                      
14 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efªciency, Equity and Progressive Taxa-
tion, 111 Yale L.J. 1391, 1405–13 (2002) (reviewing Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic 
Consequences of Taxing the Rich ( Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000)); cf. James R. Repetti, 
Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825, 840–49, 851, 873 (2001) (arguing wealth 
concentration harms the democratic process by giving too much power to the rich and 
that a tax system to prevent such wealth concentration is appropriate). 
15 See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 917, 920–21 (1978); see also Grifªth, supra note 2, at 1388. 
16 Differences in happiness could be driven by internal factors (for example, subjective 
feelings of self-worth or justiªcation for one’s riches) or external factors (for example, how 
others react to wealthier individuals based on the source and nature of the wealth). 
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duces welfare more than inºation.17 This observation, on its own, 
might suggest particular policies and allocations of resources; Profes-
sor Grifªth speciªcally offers the proposal that government programs 
aimed at aiding the unemployed (or even reducing unemployment) 
may be desirable for increasing happiness. The conclusions drawn 
from this study, however, probably should be restated to reºect the 
proªles of different sets of respondents. It may be that inºation 
harms senior citizens, welfare recipients, and the chronically unem-
ployed more than unemployment. In these cases, income support or 
measures attacking inºation may generate more beneªts than those 
targeting unemployment. 
III. Policy Implications for Taxation from the Study  
of Income and Happiness 
 Returning to the ultimate questions driving Professor Grifªth’s 
analysis—how much progressivity should we have in our tax system 
and how it should be designed?—the studies of income and happiness 
point in a number of valuable directions. First, in theory, we can have 
net redistribution without progressive taxation by working solely 
through the expenditure side.18 Certainly many factors affect the de-
cision of how best to combine the tax side and the spending side, but 
does the happiness literature have implications for that balancing 
question? For example, does a non-progressive tax system generate 
less hostility for redistributive public spending? How might a tax-
payer’s conceptions of (or reactions to) a progressive system consti-
tute a “negative” on the happiness dimension? Recalling the psychol-
ogy literature related to impact bias, if taxpayers believe that having 
progressive rates (that is, potentially higher rates) will be very un-
pleasant, how should this effect be factored in, even when the actual 
pain is less than anticipated due to impact bias and the declining 
marginal utility of money? Are we measuring happiness before or af-
ter the dollars are reallocated? Is this contrast muted by the annual 
nature of the progressive taxation “event”? 
 Second, is there a viable role for government to afªrmatively 
shape and inform taxpayers’ calculations of happiness? Perhaps we 
should envision the government’s role in progressivity policy as more 
than decision making about where and how dollars should be col-
                                                                                                                      
17 Grifªth, supra note 2, at 1391–92. 
18 Clearly there are limits to this avenue given that a signiªcant portion of government 
spending may be predetermined and not of an obviously redistributive nature. 
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lected and allocated. Maybe the role should include providing expla-
nations of the policy based on knowledge about happiness, income, 
and cognitive biases. For example, if the reason that European coun-
tries evince more popular support for redistribution draws from their 
greater homogeneity, then perhaps a more explicit policy conversa-
tion about the psychological inºuence of homogeneity and heteroge-
neity can educate and shape popular American views on the subject. 
Similarly, a variety of studies indicate that increased levels of income, 
past some basic point, do not provide corresponding increases in 
happiness; in fact, higher taxes with money spent on certain public 
goods generate more happiness. Can this information be dissemi-
nated in such a way as to begin to shape individuals’ perceptions of 
what will, in fact, make them happy?19 
 Third, an important part of the redistribution debate concerns 
the ultimate calculus—how the gains from redistribution compare to 
the efªciency costs of higher taxes (such as a decline in work effort). 
Although focused on the former (calculating the gains), Professor 
Grifªth’s Article does make the observation in the context of the 
cross-national and longitudinal studies that economic growth does 
not bring increased happiness. Essentially, the theory maintains that if 
economic growth is less valuable than we may have thought (because 
it does not really increase happiness), then redistributive policies that 
increase happiness through the reallocation of income, but with the 
side effect of decreasing economic growth, may not be such a serious 
concern. This position must be evaluated in both the short term and 
the long term. The net short-term result is plausibly the image de-
scribed above—we achieve gains created from reallocating income at 
minimal cost to happiness.20 In the long term, however, the picture 
may be notably different. Even if economic growth does not have a 
linear relationship with increased happiness, failure to achieve certain 
levels of national economic growth could result in a country being 
overtaken (literally or ªguratively) by other countries and left without 
the ability to recover. In this long-term picture, taxpayers would be 
quite unhappy when their deteriorating national situation began to 
provide them with fewer or starker choices, even if they did not fully 
appreciate economic growth when they had it. 
                                                                                                                      
19 A notable caveat here is that where higher income taxpayers feel instability in the 
economy or their futures, they may resist more psychologically based pro-redistribution 
arguments, at least in the absence of a strong government commitment to a safety net. 
20 Such costs would be due to any decline in work or economic growth. 
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Conclusion 
 The happiness literature overall seems to support the traditional 
marginal utility of income arguments espoused for progressive taxa-
tion. The analysis of this literature, however, also indicates that we 
may arrive at more nuanced conclusions about the impact of income 
on happiness and that these insights should be taken into account in 
moving from broad support for progressive taxation to advocacy of 
particular levels of progressivity and related regime design decisions. 
This initial investigation into the happiness literature yields a number 
of valuable observations for tax policy design, including the potential 
importance of the income distribution curve in a country and the po-
tential variation among groups of taxpayers with regard to how in-
come affects happiness. As psychological research into happiness de-
velops, tax law can both draw upon that research for its own policy 
needs and help shape the research by more sharply deªning the in-
formation needed to craft effective progressive tax policy. 
